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Executive Summary
Starting in 1979, pork became the most produced and consumed meat in the world. The reason for its ascent to the top of the global 
meat heap is simple: China. In 2010 alone, farmers and companies in China produced more than 50 million metric tons of pork, virtu-
ally all of which was sold and consumed domestically. This Chinese pork boom, which today accounts for half of all the pork in the 
world, is the result of a set of policies and trade agreements that liberalized and industrialized Chinese agriculture and enabled enor-
mous production increases. 
In the quest to feed 21 percent of the world’s population on nine percent of its arable land, Chinese central authorities priori-
tize ensuring a steady supply of low-priced pork as an important component of food security (China maintains a strategic pork 
reserve, the only one of its kind in the world). In the more than 30 years since Deng Xiaoping introduced the first major set of 
reforms to liberalize China’s economy in 1978, policies and investments have worked together to shape and implement a model 
of agricultural development that privileges industrial agriculture and increased meat production and consumption. While some 
of these measures have played a role in decreasing the number of hungry in the country, the crises of industrial agriculture are 
emerging, with serious implications for the environment, public health, smallholder farmers, and questions of food security. This 
paper focuses on the pork sector in particular—including the feeding of swine—as it relates to these pressing issues and challenges.
Long before “Reform and Opening,” pork was critically important in Chinese agriculture and diets. Pigs were domesticated in 
China some 10,000 years ago, and for millennia, virtually every rural household in China raised at least one or two pigs each year. 
Smallholders defined the structure of pig raising in China all the way up until the early 1980s, when industrial forms began to 
emerge. Today, smallholder farmers struggle to survive in the new market agro-economy, while specialized household producers 
and large-scale commercial operations are actively supported by policy and investment. A small number of vertically integrated, 
and predominantly domestic, agribusiness firms are claiming an ever-increasing share of pork production, processing and 
marketing. Changes in swine feeding and China’s feedstuffs imports are at the heart of this shift. The industrialization of pig 
farming in China has taken place in concert with the development of a multi-billion dollar (USD) feed industry.
Soybean imports are keeping the swine industry in China afloat. In order to overcome the limitations of domestic production 
for feeding millions of pigs, authorities enacted a series of measures to liberalize China’s soy trade, including those required by 
World Trade Organization (WTO) accession protocols, starting in the early 1990s. Imports quickly overtook both soy exports 
and domestic production, and today, China is the world’s leading soybean importer. In 2010, more than 50 million metric tons 
of soybeans came into China, mostly from the United States and Brazil. These imported beans accounted for 73 percent of soy 
consumption in China, and were used exclusively in the production of soybean meal for livestock feed and soy oil for cooking (meal 
and oil are coproducts in the soy crushing process). In stark contrast to the pork industry, which a handful of domestic companies 
dominate, transnational agribusiness firms including Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus (together, ABCD) 
and Wilmar own about 70 percent of the soybean crushing industry in China. In recent years, China has enacted measures to cool 
the dominance of foreign firms in support of domestic operations. Whether or not these moves will be effective remains to be seen.
Soy is particularly important in commercial pig feed mixes, but for smallholder and specialized household farmers, corn is the 
most used feedstuff. Corn is protected as a “strategic crop for food security,” primarily because of its role as a staple food for human 
consumption. Recently, however, corn is also being used in the manufacture of industrial products, and increasingly in commer-
cial livestock feed. In 2010, China was a net corn importer for the first time since 1995. The buyers, a state-owned conglomerate 
and a private agribusiness firm, used the corn to produce feed. Authorities claim that 2010 was an anomaly, but 2011 looks to be 
another record corn import year for the Middle Kingdom.
The consequences of these changes in pig production and pig feeding have wide-ranging impacts. In terms of environmental degra-
dation, agriculture in general—and livestock farming in particular—are the most important sources of pollution in China. Livestock 
farms produce more than 4 billion tons of manure annually, much of which contributes to nutrient overload in waterways and subse-
quent eutrophication and dead zones. Globally, as more and more land is converted to intensive monocrop production of soybeans and 
corn (and others in a narrow range of industrial feed crops), pesticide and fertilizers pollute waterways, biodiversity declines, natural 
carbon sinks are destroyed, and greenhouse gases are emitted in all stages of intensive feed production and transport.
Industrial pig feeding also carries a range public health concerns. China is becoming increasingly infamous as a site of food safety 
scandals, most of which stem from feed additives such as hormones and growth regulators ending up in meat and livestock prod-
ucts. On top of this, the prophylactic administration of antibiotics in confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) has resulted 
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in antibiotic-resistant and disease-causing organisms emerging in China, just as in the United States and Europe. Other threats to 
public health include the emergence of so-called diet-related diseases of affluence, including Type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, 
obesity and a range of cancers. At the same time, the current model of agricultural development has failed to close the gap in dietary 
and income inequalities that continue to plague China, especially in the form of differences between rural and urban populations.
Beyond environmental and health impacts, increased liberalization of agriculture is taking a toll on China’s rural population. 
Smallholder farmers struggle to access markets, meet new market standards, cover costs of production and maintain an adequate 
farm labor force. In the context of mass urban migration, many young, and especially male, rural residents are flooding China’s 
cities as migrant workers, leaving the elderly, women and children to tend their households and farms alone.
For its people, environment and penchant for self-sufficiency, a reassessment of the actual impacts of industrial pork production 
and pig feeding on China’s population and environment is needed. Redirecting research and subsidies from industrial systems to 
locally embedded systems, while maintaining food reserves, are steps in the right direction toward serving national food security, 
development and environmental needs.
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I. Introduction
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping introduced a program of economic 
reforms in China that began to move the country in the direc-
tion of becoming a market economy. The following year, pork 
started on the path to global domination as the world’s most 
produced and consumed meat. These two trajectories are 
intimately linked. While pork had been a key source of protein 
in China for thousands of years, it was only in the context of 
de-collectivizating the countryside, liberalizing agricultural 
markets, and adopting industrial production technologies 
and ideologies that China’s pork sector began to shift global 
statistics. Today, 30 years after Deng’s market reforms began, 
pigs—and what pigs are eating—in China have become big 
news and big business. The world, it seems, is watching.
The numbers that accompany the assent of China’s pork 
industry are impressive. In 2010, farmers and companies in 
China produced 50 million metric tons of pork from a domestic 
swineherd of 660 million head. This is twice the amount of 
pork produced in all 27 EU countries combined, five times 
the amount in the United States and almost half of the global 
total of 101.5 million metric tons. On the chopstick side of this 
food system sector, domestic consumption matches domestic 
production: In 2010, people in China ate 50 million metric 
tons of pork at an average rate of 37.1 kg per person1. Presently, 
pork imports and exports are negligible, and consist largely 
of trade in select body parts and products. Chinese importers, 
for instance, buy offal (organ meat) from foreign companies, 
and Chinese exporters sell cooked pork products to foreign 
traders.
China’s high level of pork self-sufficiency is a point of national 
pride and political significance. When Lester Brown published 
the book Who Will Feed China? in 1995, for example, he was 
met with a resounding response from China’s research and 
political institutions that, “We will feed ourselves!” Since 
at least the 1980s, food security through self-sufficiency 
had been a key concern of the central government, with the 
legacies of famine and isolation from the not-so-distant past 
serving as powerful motivations. Through a combination of 
food reserves, price guarantees, rural credit, input subsidies, 
support for agricultural research and extension, and political 
incentives, China has been successful in large measure in 
achieving food self-sufficiency, improving agricultural 
production, and raising living standards. But when live-
stock are involved, particularly livestock raised in confined/
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), sources of 
feed must be included in the calculus of self-sufficiency. In 
China, the stories of the pig industry and the feed industry 
are interdependent, and include farmers in North and South 
America, farmers throughout China, agricultural imports, 
foreign investment, and both domestic and transnational 
agribusiness firms. 
This report considers some of the implications of the indus-
trialization and liberalization of pig and feed production in 
China. It expands the questions of “Who will feed China?” and 
“Who will feed China’s pigs?”3 to questions of how will China 
feed its pigs, who will decide, and what will these choices 
mean for the environment, Chinese diets and food security, 
and domestic small-scale farmers? Answering these ques-
tions involves first understanding the structure and politics 
of pig and feed production in China today, and how these two 
industries are emerging together and contributing to similar 
challenges and crises in the food system.
II. From farm to factory:  
The structure of pig farming in China
Pork is a central component of Chinese agricultural systems, 
food security policy and diets. One reason for 
this is the long history of raising swine in the 
country. Pigs were domesticated from wild 
boars in southern China as early as 10,000 
years ago, and more extensively throughout 
other parts of the country 6–7,000 years ago. 
Millennia of animal husbandry produced a 
genetically diverse range of locally adapted 
indigenous pig breeds with characteristics 
such as high prolificacy (large litters) and 
juicy, flavorful pork.4 When the Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences undertook 
the first national survey of indigenous live-
stock in 1960, researchers found more than 
100 indigenous pig breeds, which ranged 
from the extreme northeast of modern 
day Heilongjiang Province, to the Tibetan 
Plateau, and all the places in between.5 
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This means that for virtually all of China’s agricultural 
history, local people raised local pigs and ate them in local 
(geographic, cultural, social, dietary) contexts. Dispersed 
swine husbandry and consumption was dominant in China 
all the way up until the end of the 20th century, when poli-
cies and markets began to change dramatically, and three 
distinct scales and forms of pig production emerged.
A. Backyard farms
For thousands of years, small-scale farmers raised all of the 
pork in China. As recently as 1985, these so-called backyard 
farmers (后院式饲养场) who raise fewer than five pigs per 
year, in addition to crops and other livestock on about a half 
acre of land, produced at least 95 percent of the country’s pork. 
They did so using indigenous pig breeds, locally occurring or 
produced feedstuffs, and centuries of accumulated agricultural 
knowledge and practice.6 Pigs in these smallholder systems 
played key agroecological roles, particularly in the conversion 
of weeds, crop residues and kitchen scraps into nutrient-rich 
manure that would fertilize crop fields. Mao Zedong wrote that, 
“The pig is a fertilizer factory on four legs,”7 and a low-input, 
low-pollution, low-carbon factory at that. Pigs also provided a 
vital source of protein for rural people who raised them largely 
for self-consumption.8 Before the 1980s when the government 
liberalized agricultural markets, farmers generally produced 
two pigs each year: one to slaughter and eat starting at Spring 
Festival (Chinese New Year), and one to sell to government 
purchasing stations in local areas at prices set by the state.9
Today, smallholder farmers, mostly women and elderly 
villagers who remain in the countryside while men migrate 
to China’s cities in search of employment, produce pigs for 
self-consumption and for markets.10 They raise pigs on a wide 
array of self-produced feedstuffs, and sometimes purchase 
commercial feed and feed supplements to use at key moments 
in the production cycle. They produce both meat pigs and 
breeding stock, and sell them to local butchers or local dealers. 
Meat is sold at wet markets—also called “traditional” or “open” 
markets where fresh meat and/or animals are sold—either 
in villages or in nearby cities. In China, wet markets can be 
roadside butcher stands, village markets where animals are 
butchered and sold, or fresh meat markets in cities.
Backyard farmers account for about 27 
percent of national pork production (Figure 2), 
though the smallholder share is much higher 
in some regions of the country. In Sichuan, 
the historic heart and current national 
leader in pork production, backyard farmers 
raise 70 percent of the pigs in the province, 
while specialized households account for 25 
percent, and large-scale commercial farms 
have only 5 percent.11 This in contrast to the 
roughly 20 percent share held by backyard 
farmers in Guangdong Province, the national 
feed industry leader and overall largest livestock (pigs and 
chickens) producing province.
B. Large-scale commercial farms
Large-scale commercial farms (大型商业养殖场) are 
increasing in both number and in pork market share in China. 
In the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978, 
methods of selling, eating and producing pork began to change. 
These reforms broke up Mao-era collectives, permitted entre-
preneurs to launch private businesses and allowed foreign 
investment to flow into China. Industrial modes of produc-
tion came on the scene, kicking off the trend toward large-
scale commercial pig raising that continues today. Before 
1979, “factory farms” that raise thousands of hogs together 
in enclosed structures using CAFO technologies were nonex-
istent in China.12 In 1985, these farms accounted for just 2.5 
percent of the country’s total pork production, but by 2007, 
China and World 2010 Pork Statistics at a Glance2 
China 2010 World 2010 China as % of World Total
Pork Production  
(1,000 metric tons) 50,000 101,507 49%
Pork Consumption  
(1,000 metric tons) 50,050 101,126 49%
Pork Imports  
(1,000 metric tons) 350 5,645 6%
Pork Exports  
(1,000 metric tons) 250 6,052 4%
Swine Production  
(1,000 head) 660,000 1,202,550 55%
Harvest time in a Sichuan Village. These smallholder farmers are 
cleaning corn, paddy rice and millet. They will use most of the corn as 
feed for their pigs.
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their share had grown to 22 percent.13 By way of comparison, 
large-scale farms (500–50,000 pigs per year) accounted for 97 
percent of all the hogs produced in the United States in 2010.14
Most large-scale commercial pig farms in China today are 
domestic enterprises. They may be state-owned, privately 
owned through sole proprietorship or partnership, joint 
ventures between Chinese and foreign firms, or between 
private and state-owned firms.15 They are supported by central 
and provincial government subsidies, in addition to state 
and private investment. Commercial farms breed, feed, rear, 
slaughter, process, and market pigs and pork. They do so in a 
variety of ways, from being specialized in one particular phase 
of production, to being vertically integrated in some or all 
phases, to managing contracts with other farms and compa-
nies to produce and sell an end product. Commercial farms 
often own their own retail brands, and “industrial pork” is sold 
almost exclusively in urban supermarkets. The scale of produc-
tion on these farms ranges from 500 to 50,000 pigs per year, 
but is rapidly increasing. It is not uncommon for a single firm 
to produce 100,000 hogs in one year, either through contracts 
with other farms, or in a single production facility.
One of the most salient features of the commercial pig 
industry in China is the trend toward vertical integration. 
Most of the major players are domestic firms with opera-
tions in more than one stage of production, including meat 
processing. The largest pork packers currently operate with 
a large degree of unfulfilled slaughter capacity. In an effort to 
fill this gap, many packers are building their own pig breeding 
and feeding facilities, and are poised to become the country’s 
largest pig producers. Some of the leading commercial pork 
companies are briefly outlined below.
AGFEED INDUSTRIES is one of the largest independent 
commercial hog producers in China. Founded in 1995 by five 
animal nutritionists from Jiangxi Province, it is now a U.S. 
public company (NASDAQ: FEED) with operations in the U.S. 
and China. AgFeed is in the process of becoming a “fully inte-
grated hog production system,” with operations in animal 
nutrition (feed), hog production and harvesting (slaughter, 
processing and marketing). The company operates five feed 
mills in Southern China that produce premixes, feed concen-
trates and complete feeds, predominantly for hogs. They 
own 31 hog farms with a total annual production capacity 
of 550,000 head. With two new breeding and feeding farms 
projects underway in Jiangxi and Guangxi Provinces, annual 
production capacity will increase to 850,000 head by 2012. 
The company intends to produce 2 million hogs per year by 
2015. AgFeed acquired M2P2, a U.S.-based hog production and 
industry management company in 2010.16 It also entered into 
a joint venture with Hypor the same year in order to expand 
hog breeding operations in China. Hypor is a subsidiary of 
Hendrix Genetics, which is the second largest pig breeding 
company in the world.17
COFCO (China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corpora-
tion) (中国粮油食品集团有限公司) is the largest edible oil and 
food producer in China, and the largest agricultural import/
export firm. It is a state-owned enterprise that is publically 
traded. Specific information and statistics about COFCO’s 
operations are difficult to find, though two large hog produc-
tion development projects have been in the press in recent 
years. In 2007, COFCO launched a pig-breeding program in 
Wuhan, the provincial capital of Hubei Province. By 2012, the 
A small village in Sichuan Province. In addition to rapeseed for oil 
production and sale, farmers are growing a wide variety of herbaceous 
plants for use as pig feed. The crop in the foreground is Niupicai, which 
is grown exclusively for pig feed.
An urban wet market in Chengdu, Sichuan Province.
8 INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY
project will be a base for 500,000 breeding sows and 10 million 
meat pigs per year, one million of which can be slaughtered 
on-site.18 In 2009, COFCO invested $588 million USD in a pig 
production and processing complex in Tianjin to serve the 
Tianjin and Beijing markets. It will produce 2 million live 
hogs and 150,000 tons of pork per year after its completion 
in 2014.19 COFCO bought a five-percent share in Smithfield 
Foods in 2008, and purchased Maverick Food, a joint venture 
between Smithfield and Belgian Artal Group in 2009.20
THE XINCHENG JINLUO GROUP (新程金锣肉制品集团有限公司), 
the commercial brand of People’s Food Holdings Limited,21 is 
the largest pork slaughter and processing company in China, 
and a  leading meat product producer. The private company 
was founded in Shandong Province in 1994, and now has 
operations in Shandong, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, 
Hunan, Henan, and Sichuan Provinces, and export branches 
in Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan. Jinluo has more than 
17,000 specialty shops and over 9,000 franchise retail outlets. 
The group produces two million tons of meat products every 
year, and has an annual slaughter capacity of 22 million hogs. 
The company is currently investing in breeding and feeding 
operations, in addition to feed production facilities, in order 
to fill their slaughter capacity.22
NEW HOPE GROUP 23 (新希望集团有限公司) is the largest 
wholly-owned private agricultural firm in China. The 
group has holdings in agribusiness and food, chemicals and 
resources, real estate and infrastructure, and finance and 
investment. New Hope is the largest livestock feed producer 
in China, and is quickly consolidating the meat, poultry 
and dairy sectors as well. In 2009, New Hope slaughtered 
1.7 million pigs, and sold 162,400 tons of chilled pork.24 Hog 
slaughter and processing capacity is 10 million head, and 
the company is developing breeding and feeding production 
bases in cooperation with Hendrix Genetics to help fill their 
slaughter production-capacity gap.25 New Hope has close 
to 400 subsidiaries and 60,000 employees. They have joint 
ventures with Chinese state-owned enterprises, and also 
have private holdings in China and overseas. The company 
is actively pursuing the central government’s “Going Global 
Strategy,” which encourages Chinese firms to invest abroad.26
THE SHINEWAY GROUP (双汇集团) is another of the largest 
pork processors in China, with annual slaughter capacity of 
more than 30 million pigs. This state-owned company was 
established in 1994 in Henan Province, and sales of fresh and 
frozen meat and livestock products exceeded 50 billion RMB ($ 
7.6 billion USD) in 2010.27 Goldman Sachs bought a 10-percent 
share in Shineway in 2006, but sold half of those shares to 
CHINA’S STRATEGIC PORK RESERVE
What do pigs have to do with social and political stability in China? 
Plenty. In a country where most of the population spends a large 
share of their household income on food, and where pork is the 
staple protein source, when the price of pork rises, discontent is 
often not far behind. In an attempt to quell potential protest that 
could threaten state power, central authorities created a strategic 
pork reserve to control pork prices and to signal the need for shifts 
in policy. This is the only reserve of its kind in the world today.
The strategic pork reserve consists of two different parts. The 
Ministry of Commerce initiated a live hog reserve that started 
operating in earnest in 2007 when the inflation rate in China 
hit 6.5 percent, and the price of meat and poultry surged 49 
percent from the previous year.35 The live hog reserve had been 
in existence before this price crisis, but was quite small and 
rather ineffective at regulating price. Today, it consists of a stock 
of a few million pigs that are rotated every four months on 200 
to 300 commercial farms.36 
The 2007 food price hikes also spurred central authorities to 
initiate a frozen pork reserve that year. Pork stocks in China were 
suffering from the PRRS (Porcine blue-ear disease) outbreak in 
2006 that killed millions of pigs, as well as a production downturn 
from high feed prices. COFCO, China’s state-owned and publi-
cally traded agribusiness conglomerate, signed a deal with U.S.-
based Smithfield Foods, the world’s largest pork producer, for 
the purchase of 60 million pounds of pork in 2007 for the frozen 
reserve. To fulfill the contract, Smithfield scaled up production 
and added 250 workers at their Sioux City, Iowa plant, expecting 
that this deal signaled the opening of a promising market for 
pork exports.37 When the Ministry of Commerce released frozen 
pork from the reserve in 2008 to calm high market prices, it was 
Smithfield pork that found its way into Chinese kitchens. In 2009, 
however, authorities decided that only domestically produced 
pork would be used for the reserve in the future. Today, the frozen 
pork reserve is administered through domestic packing plants, 
most of which also have pig production facilities.38
The specifics of how the strategic pork reserve operates are 
tightly held state secrets. According to a pork industry expert 
in China, COFCO has a monopoly on both the live hog reserve 
and frozen pork reserve.39 COFCO also has a minority share in 
Smithfield Foods,40 and in 2009, bought Smithfield out of its joint 
venture in Maverick Food.41
This worker is processing sausage at a vertically integrated company 
that owns hog production, slaughter and processing facilities, in 
addition to owning its own retail market outlets.
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CDH Investments, a Chinese private equity fund, in 2009.28 
Shineway is currently investing in its own hog production 
facilities, and hopes to produce 4 million hogs by 2015.29
THE TANGRENSHEN GROUP 30  (唐人神集团) is a shareholding 
enterprise founded in 1995. The China Agricultural University, 
the China Meat Products Research Center and Hong Kong Tai 
Sang Feeds Company are the three joint investors. The group 
has 45 subsidiaries with business in pig breeding, feed produc-
tion and meat processing, and also sells animal health products 
and owns chain store and retailing operations. Tangrenshen 
slaughters 2.6 million pigs a year, produces 40,000 metric tons 
of meat products and 3.2 million tons of livestock feed. The 
group plans to invest $342 million USD to expand pork produc-
tion to 10 million pigs per year in partnership with Whiteshire 
Hamroc, a U.S.-based pig breeding company.31
THE WEN’S FOODSTUFFS GROUP 32  (温氏食品集团) is a 
leading private agricultural company in China that operates 
through a family of 15 member companies and more than 80 
subsidiaries. Wen’s is the largest broiler producer in China, 
and also has operations in feed production, livestock equip-
ment, hog production, poultry and hog breeding, cattle and 
dairy production, vegetable production, pharmaceuticals and 
processed meat products. In 2009, Wen’s produced 3.5 million 
pigs, both in company-owned and run production facilities, 
and through contracts with specialized household pig farmers.
THE YURUN GROUP 33 (雨润集团) is a private food company 
that was founded in Nanjing in 2001, and listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange in 2005. Operating through four retail 
brands, the company processes and retails chilled and frozen 
pork, in addition to canned foods, vegetables, spices and 
imported food items. They have a pig slaughter capacity of 
28.55 million head, but slaughtered only 7 million head in 2010. 
The group is investing in land in Nanjing to establish a base 
for pig production.34
C. Specialized household farms
The number of commercial pig farms is certainly 
increasing, but in China there is an important middle 
scale of production that central and local govern-
ments have aggressively supported through favorable 
policies and subsidies. Specialized household farms (
专业化的家庭式养殖场) encompass operations with 
annual pig production from 10 to 500 head, with the 
range of 50–200 head as the most common.42 These 
farms, which accounted for 51 percent of all the pigs 
in China in 2009, may be run by individual families or 
by several backyard farmers who have come together 
to focus on pig raising more exclusively, sometimes 
with the help of government subsidies for housing 
(humans and hogs) and for animal stocking. In this 
system, farming is a professional endeavor based on produc-
tion of pigs for sale instead of self-consumption, though the 
“backyard”—an average land holding of half an acre per house-
hold—remains the primary site of operation.43
Pre-reform (before 1978)  
Traditional Backyard 
Production
Post-reform  
Specialized and 
Commercial Production
Farmers
The majority of the 
population works as farmers, 
using unpaid household 
labor to produce food.
Pig raising is a paid 
occupation, including 
business executives, scientists, 
farmers and workers.
Pork &  
Human Diets
Meat eaten primarily in 
the spring when pigs 
were slaughtered for 
Spring Festival, marginally 
throughout the rest of the 
year. Pork had a higher 
fat-lean ratio. Meat was 
peripheral in diets.
Meat consumption more 
frequent in rural and 
urban areas, but dietary 
inequalities persist by class 
and residence. Pork is 
leaner. Meat more central 
in diets.
Pork Uses & 
Markets
Most production was for 
household consumption, and 
later for local wet markets 
and state provisioning.
Pork is grown and 
sold through contract 
agreements or dealers; is 
retailed at wet markets, or 
increasingly at super- and 
hyper-markets in cities.
Production Scale
Small-scale, dispersed 
production was situated in 
localities throughout China.
Mid- to large-scale, using 
confinement technologies 
and concentrating around 
major metropolises.
Pig Productivity
Low productivity on a 
per-animal basis, production 
cycle of 10–12 months.
Highly productive with 
time-to-market requirement 
of only 5–6 months.
Pig Breeds
More than 100 indigenous 
breeds.
Three major exotic breeds: 
Duroc, Landrace, Yorkshire.
Pig Feeding
Locally occurring or 
produced weeds, table 
scraps, crop residues, 
vegetables, grains, tubers 
and agricultural byproducts.
Globally sourced oilseeds 
and grains manufactured 
into complete feeds with 
vitamins, minerals and other 
feed additives. Antibiotics 
and other growth promoters 
commonly used.
Manure
Essential source of nutrients 
for crops (fertilizer).
Waste that must be 
managed to prevent water 
and soil pollution.
Figure 2. Share of Total China Pig Production by Farm Type: 1985–2007 (%)
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Changes in feeding practices and materials have accompanied 
the scaling-up and industrialization of pig production. Some 
specialized household swine farmers produce under contract 
with large commercial farms, while others sell piglets and 
meat pigs to local dealers who then sell pigs to slaughter, 
processing, and retail companies. The specifics of produc-
tion contracts vary considerably by place and arrangement, 
but feeding is almost always a part of the agreement. Like 
large-scale commercial farms, specialized household farms 
use purchased feedstuffs for hog feeding.44 Some specialized 
farmers rely on purchased feed exclusively, while others use 
it as a supplement to self-grown feedstuffs. Taken together, 
these two models of production, which today account for the 
majority and growing share of pigs in China (73 percent in 
2007) involve a profound shift in feeding practice from locally 
occurring and produced feedstuffs, to the long-distance 
transport of processed feed, made largely from globally 
sourced oilseeds and grains.
The table on page 9 summarizes pig production practices before 
and after the 1978 reforms. Modern day backyard farms look 
similar to the “traditional” category, but with differences in 
the pig breeds used and in terms of labor and livelihoods.
Smallholders struggle to compete with the shorter production 
cycles, high levels of capitalization, easier adherence to meat 
quality and safety standards, and market control enjoyed by 
large-scale commercial farms. Specialized household farmers, 
on the other hand, occupy an insecure middle ground, strad-
dling the worlds of “traditional” and “modern” farming. Through 
government subsidies and production contracts with large farms 
and firms, they are steadily being brought under the umbrella of 
the highly integrated, capital- and input-intensive pig industry 
that is booming in China today. This boom is linked to the large-
scale commercial feed industry that took off in China during the 
same post-reform period.
III. The feed industry in China
Before 1975, a Chinese pig’s lips would never have touched 
processed feed. Grains and oilseeds were cultivated for 
human consumption, while livestock were raised on weeds, 
grass, crop residues, kitchen scraps or any of a number of 
other readily available feedstuffs. In an effort to speed up the 
conversion of plant materials into meat, from 1976 to 1985 
China’s leaders supported rapid development of a milling 
industry that would provide compound livestock feeds, as 
well as employment opportunities in rural areas. These 
changes would in turn increase meat consumption in the 
country, improving diets and food security, and moving the 
population beyond the famines and meat rationing of the past. 
Through a combination of market reforms and government 
financial support, China’s feed industry went from practically 
nothing before 1975 to becoming the world’s second largest 
feed producer by 1995. Pig feed was the first boom in the 1980s, 
followed by chicken feed in the 1990s.45
Today, China has a multi-billion dollar (USD) livestock feed 
industry. Its 2008 gross output value was 425.8 billion RMB 
($62.3 billion USD), an 8.5 percent increase from 2007. Of that 
total, 381.29 billion RMB was from formula feed, 28.66 billion 
RMB from feed additives, 6.96 billion RMB from animal-
derived feed, and 8.88 billion RMB from feed machines and 
equipment.46 For the past 10 years, domestic feed demand has 
been rising by about eight percent each year, making China 
home to one of the largest feed industries in the world, and 
poised to pass the U.S. as global leader in the coming decade. 
Since its inception, the ownership and management struc-
ture of the feed industry has changed dramatically. During 
the first two decades after reform, government agencies such 
as the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of 
Finance and Commerce (MOFCOM) managed most feed mills. 
Farmers cooperatively owned some mills through arrange-
ments called township and village enterprises (TVEs), 
generally under MOA supervision. At the same time, private 
ownership increased, and central authorities also started to 
encourage foreign firms to invest in joint venture mills. Before 
the turn of the century, private and public/private operations 
accounted for 30 percent of all mills, and foreign investment 
in 66 joint ventures totaled over $200 million USD.47 
Currently, private enterprise, both of the domestic and trans-
national agribusiness variety, defines much of the sector. This 
is particularly true in soybean crushing. One analyst estimates 
that 69 percent of the active soybean crushers in China are 
privately owned.48 Of the 31 percent state-owned share, several 
operations also have foreign and domestic private investors. 
A. Soybeans
Soybean, a plant that was domesticated in China 5,000 years 
ago, is the current feed industry star. Similar to pigs, the 
millennial-scale cultivation of soy has produced around 6,000 
domestic varieties and a rich associated knowledge about soy 
production, processing, and uses. But whereas China continues 
to be largely self-sufficient in pork as an end-product food 
category, centuries of soy self-sufficiency came to an end in the 
mid-1990s, with soy import dependency following in subse-
quent years. After being a leading soy-exporting country for 
decades, China became a net importer in 1996, and by 2003, had 
taken over as the world’s largest importer of soybeans. In 2009 
and again in 2010, China’s imports accounted for more than half 
of the total global soy market.49  
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Given that soybeans are touted as the ultimate source of 
protein in modern feed mixes for shorter-cycle, leaner pork 
production, these developments might seem natural or 
expected. Surely, most all of the rapid growth in soy imports 
is in response to increased domestic demand to feed the ever-
growing national swineherd, but the shift to imported soy and 
the associated changes in China’s feed industry are not because 
of the so-called invisible hand of the market. Rather, they are 
the direct result of a set of policies, agreements and conflicts—
some quite visible, and others less obvious—involving a 
diverse set of Chinese and international actors. For its part, 
the Chinese central government has enacted measures aimed 
at ensuring China’s food security on a limited amount of land, 
supporting increased consumption of cheap pork, liberalizing 
the soy sector, and anticipating and abiding by WTO regula-
tions. From the perspective of soybean-exporting countries 
and transnational agribusiness firms (and the institutions that 
regulate international trade), China was, and remains, a key 
site for investment and profit and a central component of future 
development plans. With soybeans, what is at stake is nothing 
less than control of the flow of soybeans into the country and 
throughout the food system.
1. Liberalizing and industrializing soy
To increase meat consumption for 1.3 billion people on only 
120 million hectares of arable land, something’s got to give. 
For China’s central authorities, a key “something” has been 
soybeans. Recognizing that domestic soy output would not 
be able to keep up with the massive growth planned for the 
livestock industry, the government moved to liberalize the 
soy sector starting in the 1990s, allowing imports to over-
take both exports and domestic production. Officials used a 
number of methods to open this market.
Central authorities implemented the Value Added Tax (VAT) 
system in 1993 to encourage production and export of certain 
products,50 and as a key source of state revenue. For food and 
agricultural goods, the VAT rate is generally 13 percent.51 In 1995, 
to spur the livestock industry and to get around limitations in 
domestic soybean crushing, the government lifted the VAT on 
soybean meal. As a result, meal imports surged to 3.6 million 
tons in 1996–1997, making China the world’s largest soybean 
meal importer that year, and then to 4.2 million tons in 1997-
1998. This increase in supply depressed domestic soy prices, 
reduced domestic crushing margins and discouraged producers 
from planting soybeans during those years. As domestic crush 
fell, so too did soy oil production, since soybean meal and soy oil 
are co-products in the crushing process. Several sources report 
edible oil smuggling in the country as a result of the shortfall. 
In an attempt to correct these imbalances, the central govern-
ment reimposed the 13-percent VAT on all imported soybean 
meal in 1999, a move that favored the import of unprocessed 
soybeans instead. Consequently, soybean meal imports 
dropped from 4.2 million tons in 1997–1998 to 0.1 million 
tons in 2000–2001, while soybean imports soared from 3.8 
million tons in 1998–1999 to 10.1 million tons in 1999–2000.52 
Domestic soybean meal prices rose, crushing margins 
improved, employment increased and edible oil smuggling 
stopped. To this day, China’s soy import strategy is focused on 
whole, unprocessed soybeans, not soybean meal.
WTO and bilateral trade agreements were also important 
drivers of soy sector liberalization. In 1996, the government 
reduced the import tariff on soybeans from 40 percent to 3 
percent in anticipation of accession to the WTO in 2001. The 
tariff rate on soybean meal was set at 5 percent, while soy 
oil was 9 percent.53 In 1999, China and the U.S. became closer 
trade partners when the two countries signed a bilateral 
trade agreement that contained a tariff-rate quota for soy oil 
(that would later turn into a bound 9-percent tariff rate), but 
excluded soybeans and soybean meal.54 In 2003, Brazil came 
on the scene when China accepted the country’s soy export 
application.55 These agreements defined the terms of trade 
and China’s major trading partners for the next several years. 
Changes in how soybeans and soybean meal are defined and 
regulated were also key policy maneuvers with important 
consequences for trade and domestic production. In 2002, in 
order to raise domestic soybean meal prices after supplies 
exceeded demand, central authorities defined soybean meal 
as an industrial, rather than agricultural, product. This 
language changed the tax structure of soybean meal, giving 
it a 13 percent export tariff refund to encourage exports and 
to relieve excess supply on the domestic market.56 Redefining 
soy in this way was related to the government’s more general 
reclassification of it as a “non-strategic” crop for food security. 
Upon accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s overall strategy 
was to focus food security policy on maintaining strategic 
reserves of rice, corn and wheat—crops considered impor-
tant for direct human consumption—while liberalizing the 
markets for other non-staple crops in order to honor accession 
protocols and commitments. At that time, authorities liberal-
ized soybeans from strict state control, and removed so-called 
trade-distorting mechanisms.57 According to experts within 
China, the main reason that soy was “cut loose” was to ensure 
adequate supplies of feed for industrial pork production. 
As a result of this sectoral restructuring, soybean imports 
have been soaring since the late 1990s at an average annual 
growth rate of about 26 percent. From 2009–2010, China 
imported just over 50 million tons of soybeans, representing 
58 percent of all soybean imports worldwide.58 Imported soy 
is crushed domestically to produce livestock feed (soybean 
meal) and soy oil. Between 2000 and 2007, soy crushing in 
China increased 72 percent, from 19.77 million tons to 34 
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million tons, at an 8.1 percent average annual increase.59 In 
2009–2010, China produced more than 38 million tons of 
soybean meal, and in 2010–2011, is expected to produce 42 
million tons. As for soy oil, production in 2009–2010 was 
more than 8 million tons, and more than 10 million tons are 
expected in 2010–2011.60 
These figures make China the world leader in both soybean 
meal and oil production, but it is important to remember that 
this output comes overwhelmingly from imported beans. In 
2009, 73 percent of the soybeans consumed in China were 
imported.61  The United States and South America (Brazil and 
Argentina62) are seasonal complimentary soybean suppliers 
for China. Because of the “opposite” growing seasons in 
these two global locations, South America soy imports domi-
nate from June to October and United States imports from 
November to May.63 This system means that U.S. beans are in 
direct competition with Chinese domestic beans because they 
share the same growing season.
2. Soybean wars and foreign crusher dominance
The dominance of foreign firms in the Chinese soybean 
industry is one the most contentious issues in China soy 
policy and production circles. The situation is reported in the 
Chinese media as “Soybean Wars,” “Battle of the Beans,” and 
“Foreign Companies Eat Up Our Country’s Soybean Industry,” 
suggesting the conflict between transnational agribusiness 
firms and domestic crushers and producers. While foreign 
enterprises started to enter the Chinese feed industry in the 
1980s through joint ventures with domestic mills, it was only 
after the soy crusher defaults in 2004 that these companies 
were able to take control of 80 percent of Chinese soy crushing, 
ushering in a new era of foreign domination.
After the 13 percent VAT on soybean meal was reimposed in 1999, 
there was an unprecedented crushing boom in China to accom-
pany the surge of whole soybean imports. Investment in the 
sector soared and crush capacity expanded beyond production. 
At the same time, toward the end of 2003, China and the U.S. 
were on the brink of a trade war because of the U.S.’s growing 
trade deficit. Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, made a trip 
to the U.S. and promised to send delegates the next year to 
purchase agricultural products, primarily “non-strategic” soy 
and cotton.  The monthly average soybean future price on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) at the time of Prime Minister 
Wen’s visit was $7.70 USD per bushel. In March and April of 
2004, when Chinese buyers arrived in the U.S. to make the 
bulk of soy purchases as per the previous agreement, the price 
of soybeans had skyrocketed to $9.82 and $9.89 USD per bushel 
respectively. Average April prices in 2003 and 2005 were $6.04 
and $6.23 USD per bushel respectively, so the almost $10 USD 
per bushel price was an anomaly.65  
When deliveries and payments came due from the Chinese 
buyers in June, July and August of 2004, the price of soybeans 
had tanked to $5.93 USD per bushel. Rather than incur losses 
from the radically different per-bushel price at the time of 
purchase and the time of delivery, many Chinese importers 
defaulted on their contracts. Angry traders took the case to 
arbitration at GAFTA (Grain and Feed Trade Association) in 
London. Because price fluctuations are perfectly legal under 
the international pricing system based on CBOT futures, 
but defaulting on trade contracts is not, the final ruling was 
against the Chinese crushers. They were required to fulfill 
their contracts and pay for soy shipments at the abnormally 
high March and April prices. A Chinese Academy of Science 
study estimated that Chinese crushers overpaid for this soy 
by a margin of at least $1.5 billion USD.66  
The immediate result was that many Chinese crushers were 
forced into bankruptcy and had no choice but to sell to foreign 
firms. Predictably, the firms that made the most market 
headway after the crusher defaults were already leaders 
in the global soy trade.67 ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis 
Dreyfus (together, ABCD) bought over 70 percent of the 
shut-down Chinese crushers, and Singapore-based Wilmar 
also increased its market share at that time.68 It is important 
to note, however, that New Hope Group, a private domestic 
firm with annual feed production capacity of over 20 million 
metric tons,69 is the largest feed producer in the country.
Official statistics on the number and type of feed enterprises 
in China also illustrate the continuing and growing promi-
nence and concentration of foreign firm ownership. According 
to Ministry of Agriculture figures, there were 13,612 feed 
enterprises in 2008. This was 11.5 percent lower (1,764 fewer 
operations) than in 2007, and recorded the third consecutive 
year of diminishing numbers. The only enterprise catego-
ries that saw an increase in the number of operations were 
foreign-funded and joint-stock enterprises. All other catego-
ries declined.70
China: Soy Figures 2009–201064
Soybean imports 50.34 million tons
Soybean production 14.7 million tons
Soybean meal production 39 million tons
Soybean oil production 8.7 million tons
Soy imports as % of total soy consumption 73%
GM soy imports as % of total imports 90%
Soybean import tariff rate 3%
Value of imported soybeans as a percentage of the value 
of all imported agricultural products 35.8%
Imported volume of soybeans compared to imported 
volume of all grains/other oilseeds combined 13.5 times
Value of imported soybeans compared to the total value 
of all imported grains/oilseeds 20.8 times
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Livestock feed is the main driver in the soybean crushing 
industry but soy oil is also becoming increasingly important. 
Before industrialization of pig and feed production, small-
scale farmers cooked their meals with fat from the pigs they 
slaughtered in the spring, or pressed a small amount of cooking 
oil from crops produced locally. Today, edible oils have also 
been largely commercialized, and soy oil is now the leading 
cooking oil in China, accounting for 40 percent of national 
use.71 While there is regional variation in household edible oil 
consumption, with rapeseed, palm and peanut oil dominating 
in some parts of the country, soy oil is gaining more and more 
of the market. According to a scholar at a leading Chinese 
agricultural university, virtually all restaurants in China 
today—from street vendors to upscale eateries—use soy oil for 
cooking.72 It has completely taken over the restaurant sector.
Foreign firms have an important presence in soy oil produc-
tion, with several operating under their own brands within 
China. Jinlongyu (金龙鱼) has 30–40 percent of the total 
market for all edible oils in China, and is an important soy oil 
brand. Its parent company, Arwana, is owned by Kerry Oils 
and Grains, which was just purchased by Singapore-based 
Wilmar. Bunge started the Douweijia (豆维家) brand of soy oil 
in Nanjing in 2007. ADM and Wilmar have a joint venture in 
the Jinhai brand (金海) of products, including the Sania (莎妮
雅) soy oil brand. Through a joint venture with China National 
Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), ADM and 
Wilmar also own five companies of crushers and refiners. 
On its website, ADM notes that, “A key part of ADM’s Asia 
strategy today is our strategic ownership interest in Wilmar 
International Limited.”73 Cargill and Dreyfuss don not pres-
ently have their own retail soy brands, but instead sell unre-
fined oil to local refiners or to ADM enterprises. 
As a result of the crusher defaults in 2004, on top of crusher 
buyouts, half of all domestic soy oil refineries were forced to 
close. Transnational agribusiness corporations now control 
80 percent of soybean crushing, and control 60 percent of 
China’s soy oil refining.74 This means that the same firms that 
control soybean exports to China from production centers in 
the U.S. and South America are also the major importers that 
control the flow of soy through the Chinese food system.
3. Protecting domestic soy
Changes in the feed industry, including ever-increasing 
soybean imports and the dominance of foreign firms, have 
had definitive impacts not only on domestic soy crushing 
and oil refining, but also on domestic soy production and 
farmers. In 2009, Chinese farmers produced 16 million tons of 
soybeans on 9 million hectares, or 7.5 percent of the country’s 
total arable land.75 Liberalization of the sector has meant that 
surging soy imports have dramatically outpaced domestic 
production, and more and more farmers are opting out of 
planting soy (Figure 3).
Soy experts in China estimate that there are 25 million 
smallholder soy farmers in the country today.76 So while 
large-scale soy production is increasing—with groups like 
Beidahuang,77 a state-owned conglomerate working to scale-
up and mechanize production to increase per-acre produc-
tivity—smallholders play a vital role in the soy sector, acting 
Figure 3. China Soybean Production, Imports, and Exports: 1978-2009 (tonnes)
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both individually and through cooperatives. The real story 
behind domestic soy production, therefore, is the story of the 
struggles of smallholders whose livelihoods are endangered 
by changes in the soy industry and in soy pricing.
There are several reasons why farmers move out of soy produc-
tion in China. One important factor is that the market price 
of imported soybeans is cheaper than that of domestic soy. A 
complex mix of commodity programs, agricultural policies, 
and pricing schemes in the United States and South America 
keeps the market price of soybeans (and other agricultural 
commodities) below the cost of production. This is a well-
documented phenomenon that has led to unfair competition 
and dumping on world markets for decades.78 When domestic 
farmers are undercut by cheap imports, one immediate result 
is that those farmers can no longer make a living from their 
crops, and are often forced out. On top of this, the foreign firms 
that control 80 percent of crushing and 60 percent of refining 
in China have the ability to import soybeans from their own 
production centers around the world at a price much cheaper 
than what domestic soybeans can sell for. In 2010, imported 
soybeans in China were 300 to 600 RMB cheaper per ton 
than domestic beans.79 This situation means that not only are 
domestic soy prices depressed, but that both foreign-owned 
and domestic crushers are buying more imported beans in 
order to increase profits, or in some cases, to stay in business. 
Tian Renli, the president of Heilongjiang Jiusan Oil and Fats 
Company said, “It’s not that the processors don’t want to use 
domestic soybeans, but we can’t at current prices.”80 Domestic 
crushers can buy soy from local farmer co-ops, but increas-
ingly they are getting soy supplies from the same foreign 
firms that control the vast majority of the processing sector. 
The GM issue, which is highly controversial in China, further 
complicates soybean pricing. Currently, the central govern-
ment prohibits commercial planting of GM food crops, but 
unlike most other countries with similar bans, allows 
imports.81 In 2009, 90 percent of soy imports were GM.82 
Given that 73 percent of the soy consumed in China in 2009 
was imported, and that 90 percent of imports were GM, that 
means that 81 percent of all soy was GM. Clearly, this is a chal-
lenging market situation for domestic producers who grow 
non-GM soy that should fetch a premium price, but instead 
creates a barrier for them when they are faced with buyers 
who want (or need) the cheapest beans possible. There is little 
incentive for crushers to buy domestic non-GM soy because, 
on the other side of processing, the price of GM and non-GM 
soybean meal and soy oil is largely the same. 
Farmers are having a hard time breaking even from planting soy, 
and for smallholders in particular, who have an average annual 
income of about $690 USD (4,616 RMB), the implications are 
especially serious. Experts estimate that 30 percent of soybean 
farmers have already left their homes and families to become 
migrant workers in China’s coastal cities. Liberalization of the 
soy sector, including the mass influx of cheap soy imports and 
domination by foreign processors, is linked to urban migration 
in complex ways (Read more in the final section).
The mix of low soy prices for domestic farmers, cheap GM 
soy imports, foreign domination of soy crushing and oil 
processing, and the exodus of soy farmers to labor in the 
cities has led to a domestic sector in trouble. In response, 
central authorities have taken measures to protect the soy 
industry, and experts have advised on alternative markets 
and strategies. 2008 was a particularly active year for soy 
regulation.  On August 22, China’s National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) issued a directive on the future 
direction of the domestic soy sector. Some of the key provi-
sions included policies to further concentrate soy production 
and processing in the Northeast and in Inner Mongolia, to 
scale-up and further industrialize the sector, to develop and 
improve the domestic soybean futures market, to establish 
a soybean reserve system for commercial circulation, and to 
develop soy industry standards. The aim of these measures 
was to support domestic production and maintain a consis-
tent supply of soy. 
Also in 2008, the central government imposed new restric-
tions on foreign investment in soy processing to limit the 
expansion of foreign control, and to try to level the playing 
field for domestic firms. By these provisions, foreign firms 
are not allowed to expand existing operations, invest in new 
operations, or have a controlling share (more than 50 percent) 
in new joint ventures.
To help alleviate downward price pressure on farmers in 2008, 
the central government started buying domestic soy at a 
minimum purchase price. At that time, international futures 
markets fell because of the financial crisis, initiating a flood of 
even cheaper soy into China.83 The state minimum purchase 
and storage price for 2008–2009 was 3.7 RMB per kg, and 3.74 
RMB per kg for 2009–2010.84 Between October 2008 and June 
2009, the China Grain Reserve Corporation (CGRC) bought 
7.25 million tons of soybeans in Northeast China at 3.7 RMB 
per kilogram.85 
Over the past two years, protective purchasing has helped 
to swell the state reserves in Heilongjiang Province and 
domestic crushers are now negotiating on the purchase of 
soy from these stockpiles. The degree to which the minimum 
pricing scheme has helped smallholders and domestic proces-
sors, however, is unclear. Many farmers couldn’t afford to 
transport their beans to state warehouses to collect the 
higher payments. Additionally, the state reserve only bought 
the highest quality soybeans, and even at that, couldn’t buy 
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the total domestic harvest. Price alone, therefore, wasn’t 
enough to save all of China’s soy farmers. Some domestic 
processors didn’t fare much better. The increased domestic 
soy price meant that processors’ profit margins shrunk.86 
Even after the government provided rebates to processors for 
buying domestic beans, they were still losing money. Further, 
protective purchasing in 2008 has been linked to another 
wave of processing plant closures in Heilongjiang that year, 
further challenging the ability of domestic producers, espe-
cially smallholders, to sell their soy.
The Chinese Soybean Industry Association (CSIA) has 
proposed alternatives for the soy sector. Along with other 
experts, the CSIA urges that China should develop new 
markets for domestic soy so that it doesn’t compete directly 
with cheap GM imports. There are two main proposals on the 
table. One is to use domestic soy exclusively in the manufac-
ture of foodstuffs such as tofu, soymilk and vegetarian prod-
ucts to be marketed within China. This proposal could also 
include marketing sustainable soy products to link producers 
to the growing domestic market for sustainable food prod-
ucts. Presently, there are a handful of Chinese firms using 
this model. The other proposal is to (re-) develop the export 
market for non-GM soy to Japan, South Korea and European 
countries. This would involve improving soy varieties and 
quality to internationally accepted standards, and imple-
menting local monitoring and certification schemes. Both of 
these proposals aim at separating the markets for domestic 
and imported soybeans to benefit Chinese producers and 
processors. There are similar proposals for labeling and 
promoting non-GM soy oil.
B. Corn
Soy has a competitor in China’s feed industry, and its name 
is corn. While soy is a native crop, corn was introduced from 
the Americas only during the Ming Dynasty, sometime in 
the early to mid 16th century.87 Corn and soybeans today are 
prime competitors for land and trade, and increasingly, as 
components in livestock feed. Considering productive area, 
both crops are grown primarily in the Northeast—the soy 
base is Heilongjiang Province, while Jilin Province is the main 
corn region. If farmers opt out of soy production, they often 
plant corn instead (and vice versa in some cases). Throughout 
the 20th century, corn has been more widely planted than 
soy (Figure 4), but in some places in the Northeast, officials 
encourage farmers to rotate the two crops. This is the domi-
nant practice in the USA, but is not widely used in China.
In the early 2000s, corn and soy roughly offset each other 
in terms of value, largely because of massive soy imports 
coupled with the need for heavy subsidies for corn produc-
tion and export. The central government, in other words, has 
devoted huge amounts of money to these two crops.
1. Regulating and industrializing corn
Unlike soy, corn is considered a strategic crop for food security, 
and so is more tightly regulated by the central government. 
China is a world leader in corn production, and is historically 
a regular net exporter with negligible imports. In the past ten 
years, however, the situation in the corn sector has started to 
change dramatically.
The structure of state support for corn production changed in 
2001 when China joined the WTO. In order to fulfill commit-
ments, China was required to eliminate export subsidies on 
Figure 4. China Harvested Area of Maize and Soybeans: 1978-2009 (hectares)
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corn and open a 5.85 million ton quota for corn imports at a 
one-percent tariff rate.88 These measures were expected 
to significantly decrease China’s corn exports and increase 
imports, but much to the surprise of analysts and traders, 
China’s corn exports in 2002—the year after WTO accession 
—were the highest in the country’s history. Corn imports in 
2002 were also insignificant, meaning that in its first year 
as a WTO member, China remained, and even increased, its 
global position as a net corn exporter. In 2003, corn exports 
were even higher, supported not by the WTO-forbidden 
direct export subsidies, but by a package of measures aimed 
at boosting corn sales to promote the livestock industry and 
domestic meat consumption. These measures included subsi-
dies for corn sales from state grain reserves, railroad tax and 
grain shipment waivers, subsidies for port fees, and a VAT 
rebate for exported corn. 
The above policies were so successful in promoting production 
that throughout the early 2000s, corn supply in China persis-
tently exceeded demand, exports boomed and corn prices rose 
steadily throughout the first years of the new millennium. 
In 2007, central authorities began to encourage and support 
industrial corn processing as a way to deal with excess supply. 
In the 2007-08 market year, about one fourth of the country’s 
total corn use was in industrial products such as corn starches, 
sweeteners, alcohols, amino acids and citric acid. China also 
began exporting these products, changing its corn export 
profile from trading mostly in unprocessed corn, to exporting 
mainly industrial products. Industrial corn exports are now 
three times as high as unprocessed corn exports.89
2. From leading corn exporter to net corn importer
Perhaps the most profound change in the corn sector over the 
last decade is the 1.3 million tons of corn that China imported 
from the United States in 2010. While this amount is small 
relative to China’s total corn production (158 million tons in 
2009–2010, and expected 168 million tons in 2010–2011), it 
accounted for 1.4 percent of the total global corn trade.90 This 
was the first time since 1994–1995 that China was a net corn 
importer. At that time, central authorities cut off exports of 
corn and other grains because of widespread concerns about 
grain shortages and inflation.91
The reasons for 2010’s amped up imports are related to high 
domestic corn prices, though among analysts and officials 
there is disagreement about what drove prices up in the first 
place. Government officials at the National Grain and Oils 
Information Center urge that rising corn prices were not the 
result of falling domestic supplies or reserves, but that market 
speculation was to blame.92 Central authorities seem to be 
arguing that once they crack down on illegal activities that 
force prices up (i.e., hoarding), China will return to being a net 
exporter, and corn self-sufficiency will be preserved.93 They 
insist that the country will not continue to import significant 
amounts of corn in the future, despite the USDA’s prediction 
that 2011 imports will top 1 million tons. 
Analysts at the United States Grains Council (USGC) agree that 
market speculation played a role in increasing corn prices, but 
argue that drought in 2009 coupled with cool and wet condi-
tions at spring planting in 2010 also contribute significantly to 
the high price situation, as did increased processing demand 
for the livestock industry.94 These analysts, along with global 
grain traders, predict that China will continue to import corn, 
mostly for feed, and will remain a net importer into the fore-
seeable future.95 Hanver Li, the Chairman of Shanghai JC Intel-
ligence Co, a Sino-U.S. joint venture agro-commodities invest-
ment advisor, went so far as to say that, “A new era of China 
importing corn is here,” calling the present moment a “turning 
point” at which China will become a regular corn buyer. Li and 
other experts predict that China’s annual corn purchases will 
reach 15 million tons by 2015.96 Traders are also anxious for 
China to continue purchasing corn to help recover low inter-
national prices, and trade groups like the USGC are excited 
by the market opportunities. Thomas Dorr, USGC president, 
said, “There is evidence that [China’s] demand for high-quality 
proteins is going to require added energy for livestock rations 
and we believe it’s an excellent opportunity for the U.S. to 
provide those corn supplies as needed.”97
As for the mechanics of the 2010 corn imports, COFCO 
was the top buyer, and the New Hope Group was number 
two. COFCO didn’t release plans for how it would use the 
imported corn, but the New Hope Group stated publically 
that it would use purchased corn in the manufacture of pig 
feed.98 Some imports will likely go to restore state stockpiles 
that were drained through auction to cool local prices earlier 
in 2010. From April 13 to May 25, the state sold 4.67 million 
tons of reserve corn, mostly to traders in the Northeast who 
quickly shipped it to Guangdong Province for livestock feed 
processing.99 After six rounds of sales, corn futures on the 
Dalian Commodity Exchange rose to 1,984 RMB ($302 USD) 
per ton on May 24, a two-year high. By opening the door to 
corn imports, the central government used the international 
market to stabilize the domestic market.
Aside from worries in Beijing that China will no longer be 
self-sufficient in grain, there are several other concerns asso-
ciated with the possibility that China’s corn imports might 
continue into the long run. First, in terms of global food 
supplies, if China becomes a major importer, there are fears 
that price fluctuations in global markets will become increas-
ingly dramatic, as the world relies on an even narrower set of 
countries to supply corn. Jay O’Neil, an agricultural economist 
at Kansas State University in the United States, said, “This 
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means there are fewer countries supplying the needs of a 
growing world and the potential for crop production short-
falls is a greater risk to everyone.”100 
There are also important climate and environmental concerns, 
particularly in terms of the deepening relations between 
pig production in China and soybean and grain produc-
tion in South America. Tom Philpott argues that increased 
corn demand from China can only result in more land being 
cleared in South America for large corn plantations.101 Already, 
deforestation has claimed 528,000 square kilometers of the 
Brazilian Amazon as cattle grazing and large-scale soybean 
fields have taken over. Soy production in Brazil quadrupled 
between 1995 and 2009, and almost half of all exports went 
to China for the feed industry.102 At the same time, almost half 
(1 million square kilometers) of Brazil’s Cerrado, the most 
biologically diverse savannah in the world, has been burned 
for use as cattle pasture, sugarcane fields for ethanol produc-
tion, and large-scale soybean and corn cultivation, primarily 
for export and the manufacture of livestock feed.103
This conversion of mass tracts of land to intensive monocrop 
agriculture has threatened the livelihoods of many small-
holder Brazilian farmers who are forced to move. At the same 
time, both the processes and long-term impacts of removing 
forest and burning grasslands contribute to climate change, 
as CO2 stores are released and sinks are lost. On top of that, 
transporting massive amounts of feed around the globe, from 
Brazil to China for instance, further strains fuel demand and 
contributes even more GHG emissions. If South American 
countries pursue monocrop corn plantations that mirror the 
way soy has been developed there, these impacts will be even 
more serious.
Inside China, there are concerns around the GM issue, given 
that 60 percent of the corn imported in 2010 was genetically 
modified.104 That said, in 2009 China’s central government 
approved the first strain of homegrown GM corn to be grown 
for research purposes only.105 It also approved 11 varieties of 
GM corn for import. While the official stance on GM crops 
may be changing and perhaps moving toward acceptance, 
even if the general public continues to have reservations. 
Finally, if corn goes the way of soy in China, and imports 
become a regular occurrence, what are the costs to China’s 
small-scale producers? How will their livelihoods be 
affected?  What will they grow if they can’t compete with low 
market prices for either corn or soybeans? Similarly, how do 
these changes in the structure of the corn industry affect food 
security, given that 64 percent of corn is being used as live-
stock feed, 25 percent for industrial uses and only 11 percent 
as edible grain?106 Because corn is now primarily used for live-
stock feed, the central government is considering a revision 
to current trade policy, such that corn would no longer be 
regulated in the same way as grains intended exclusively for 
human consumption.107  
The focus on developing a domestic corn processing industry, 
allowing GM imports, and the possibility that the central 
government will reclassify corn as a “non-strategic” crop, 
makes this sector sound quite similar to the soy sector. A feed 
mill executive in Guangdong Province said, “We think corn 
will follow soy, and imports will become a normal practice 
whenever there is need.”108 COFCO officials maintain that corn 
imports will always be a supplement to domestic production, 
and that the central government is committed to regulating 
this sector. Corn planting is expected to increase in 2011 to help 
decrease imports, but international industry and trade groups 
are focused on creating more regular corn trade with China in 
the future. The battle, so to speak, seems poised to rage on.
Feeding China’s pigs: 
Challenges and issues
The feed industry in China can be classified as operating 
through a combination of local and transnational agribusi-
ness firms that use mostly domestically produced grains and 
mainly imported oilseeds (soybeans), together with addi-
tives manufactured in China and abroad, to produce feed for 
the rapidly industrializing livestock sector. There are other 
commercial feed crops and ingredients, but today soybeans 
and corn account for the lion’s share. The vast majority of pigs 
raised each year in China are eating commercial feed at some 
point in the production cycle, and as the scale of pig produc-
tion continues to increase, so too will the scale and extent of 
the feed industry. Trends in industrial pig feeding seem to 
inevitably point to additional soybean and corn imports in 
the future, further narrowing the range of feedstuffs used to 
produce pork.
Central policies and subsidies, and so-called market signals 
for increased (lean) meat demand, have been used to define 
the slower growth cycle and fattier pork output from small-
holders as “backwards.” It is highly unlikely, therefore, that 
“traditional” feeding, which happens to be a highly environ-
mentally sustainable and near carbon-neutral activity, will 
be promoted or supported as part of China’s agricultural 
development model. Instead, industrial feeding will continue 
to be relentlessly promoted as the most modern, efficient, 
and safe method for further increasing pork production and 
consumption in China. This will have serious implications 
for the environment, for Chinese diets and public health, for 
smallholders and for food security.
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A. Environmental challenges and issues
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) stated in 2006 
that, “The livestock sector emerges as one of the two or three 
most significant contributors to the most serious environ-
mental problems, at every scale from local to global.”109 To 
put this statement more bluntly, it is the livestock industry, 
including intensive animal feeding and feedstuff production, 
that is the overwhelming cause of these problems. Issues 
such as water pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, reduced 
genetic and species diversity, and the emergence of antibiotic-
resistant disease-causing organisms are increasing both in 
scale and global relevance. In China, the rush to increase meat 
consumption is implicated in these and a number of other 
environmental problems. The effects have both domestic and 
global reach.
1. Water and soil pollution
In February of 2010, the Chinese government released results 
of the first national pollution census110 (全国污染源普查). The 
most startling finding of this nearly three-year, 737 million 
RMB ($110 million USD) investigation was that agriculture 
today is a bigger source of water pollution in China than 
industry. Researchers found that farming was responsible 
for 44 percent of chemical oxygen demand (COD—the main 
measure of organic compounds in water), 67 percent of phos-
phorus discharges, and 57 percent of nitrogen discharges into 
bodies of water. The Ministry of Agriculture immediately 
recognized that these findings were the direct result of the 
shift to intensive farming methods over the past 30 years. 
The Ministry’s Wang Yangliang said:
Fertilizers and pesticides have played an important role 
in enhancing productivity but in certain areas improper 
use has had a grave impact on the environment. The 
fast development of livestock breeding and aquaculture 
has produced a lot of food but they are also major 
sources of pollution in our lives.111
Fertilizer- and pesticide-containing runoff from crop fields 
(vegetables, grains, oilseeds, cotton, etc.) is an important 
source of this water pollution. Greenpeace estimates that 
China uses 35 percent of the world’s fertilizer, and pesticide 
use is increasing every year. In 2006, Chinese farmers used 1.2 
million tons of pesticide on approximately 300 million hect-
ares of farmland and forest. In 2009, China was the world’s 
largest pesticide producer. Output volume was 2.23 million 
tons, export volume was 0.51 million tons and leftover pesti-
cide demand was 400,000 tons.112 As a result of increased fertil-
izer and pesticide application, at least seven percent of arable 
land is polluted from improper use, in addition to significantly 
increased water pollution levels throughout the country.113
Manure is an even more important source of pollution. Experts 
warn that the massive increase of animal waste from the live-
stock industry is the main source of water pollution in China 
today. According to Ministry of Agriculture statistics, in 2000, 
China’s livestock produced 3.8 billion tons of manure, and by 
2008, the figure was 4.8 billion tons.114 The sheer volume of 
manure shifts it from being a valuable resource, to a waste-
management problem with severe ecological consequences. 
Such massive amounts of manure contribute to nutrient over-
load on land and in waterways. This is particularly evident in 
the rapidly increasing incidence of blue-green algae outbreaks 
in China’s lakes and streams. Eutrophication results when 
intensive livestock farms, which generally lack effective water 
treatment methods to deal with the rivers of manure coming 
out of them, deposit excessive amounts of phosphorus and 
nitrogen in nearby bodies of water.115 The problem is exacer-
bated when inland water flows to coastal areas. As a direct 
result of runoff containing excess nutrients from fertilizers 
and manure carried by the Changjiang (Yangtze) and Huanghe 
(Yellow) Rivers, a dead zone has developed in the East China 
Sea.116 This has serious consequences for ecosystem functioning. 
Because the government has failed to institute regulations to 
strictly manage manure runoff from industrial operations, pig 
farms are not being forced to internalize the environmental 
costs of manure treatment.
2. Greenhouse gas emissions
Globally, the livestock industry contributes 18 percent of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.117 There 
are three main GHGs that come from the livestock industry 
in significant amounts: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and 
nitrous oxide. Carbon dioxide is emitted at virtually every 
stage in the production and transportation of livestock prod-
ucts and feed, accounting for nine percent of all human-made 
CO2 emissions globally. Methane, a gas that is 23 times more 
potent in the atmosphere than CO2, is emitted from enteric 
fermentation (flatulence in ruminants) and from manure. The 
livestock industry is responsible for 37 percent of all human-
made methane emissions globally. Manure also accounts for 
65 percent of all global human-made emissions of nitrous 
oxide, which is 296 times more potent than CO2.118
 At the same time that China’s livestock industry is growing, 
so too are the country’s GHG emissions. China passed the 
U.S. in 2008 as the world’s largest emitter, with current 
emissions that account for 17.3 percent of the global total.119 
This is a dramatic shift from the carbon-absorbing economy 
that defined China for thousands of years, before it began to 
industrialize its agricultural (and other) sectors.120 The further 
increase in industrial livestock feeding will exacerbate the 
above GHG emissions figures and the problems associated 
with them, both inside China and internationally.121 Already, 
erratic weather (linked to climate change) is wreaking havoc 
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on agricultural production and communities in China, as 
evidenced by severe drought in 2009 and 2010, followed by 
rampant flooding in 2010. Experts predict these patterns will 
continue, and intensify in the coming years.122
3. Genetic and species diversity
The focus on a narrow range of crops and livestock to meet 
dietary needs has led to a global reduction in genetic and 
species diversity. The cases of soybeans and pigs in China illus-
trate this trend. The more than 6,000 varieties of soybeans 
that Chinese farmers have developed over thousands of years 
account for 90 percent of all the soybean varieties in the world. 
Today, only a few varieties make up the core of the soybean 
industry; experts fear that if GM soy production is allowed 
in China, most wild types will be wiped out.123 The conver-
sion of mass tracts of land to monoculture crop production in 
the country’s Northeast and elsewhere will further reduce 
overall agroecosystem species diversity. 
Swine breeds have already been significantly reduced. The 
“modern industrial hog,” prized for quickly converting feed 
into lean pork, has taken over. Presently, just three exotic 
breeds, namely Duroc, Landrace and Yorkshire (DLY) have 
replaced the more than 100 indigenous pig breeds in China. 
Farmers at all scales of swine production, from the back-
yard to the CAFO, raise these breeds either in pure or hybrid 
form. Indigenous breeds are now maintained on conserva-
tion farms and in the national gene bank, but very few (less 
than 5 percent of China’s total swine production) are raised by 
farmers for pork.124 Consequences of relying on a narrow range 
of intensively bred livestock breeds include the loss of genetic 
traits such as prolificacy or fertility, increased vulnerability 
to disease and extinction of local breeds. At the same time, 
reliance on industrial swine breeds, especially to the degree 
currently seen in China, is coupled with horizontal and 
vertical integration of ownership by a handful of agribusi-
nesses.125 PIC (the Pig Improvement Company) and Hendrix 
Genetics are already major players in providing breeding 
stock in China, as they are globally.
4. Antibiotic resistance
Industrial livestock feeding generally includes administering 
constant “subtherapeutic” doses of antibiotics throughout 
the production cycle. This is done to prophylactically prevent 
disease and to promote growth by making the conversion of 
feed to weight gain more efficient. As a result of such over-
use, antibiotic-resistant strains of disease-causing organ-
isms (mostly bacteria) have rapidly emerged, compromising 
the ability of medicines to treat disease in both humans 
and other animals.126 This phenomenon is expected, and has 
serious public health implications:
Through evolutionary adaptation, disease-causing 
organisms (e.g., E. coli) almost always develop 
resistance to substances that humans exploit to kill 
them. In other words, they acquire the ability to thwart 
the toxicity of medicines designed to control them. 
The widespread and routine use of antibiotic drugs 
accelerates this evolutionary process, to the point 
where the declining effectiveness of antibiotics is now 
considered a serious public health crisis, expressed in 
the rising incidence of drug-resistant infections.127
There are three primary ways that antibiotic-resistance is 
conferred in the livestock industry. Drugs fed to animals 
are excreted in manure, and are then carried into the envi-
ronment via runoff from feeding operations. The antibiotics 
kill susceptible microorganisms in soil and water, leaving 
bacteria with rare resistance to the drugs to flourish. This 
same selection process can also take place in animals’ diges-
tive tracts, and when manure is applied to soil as fertilizer, 
resistant bacteria in the manure can transfer resistance to 
bacteria in the soil. Disease-causing organisms can also 
share genes that encode resistance to antibiotics. Similarly, 
gene sharing can occur across different species, for instance 
through fecal bacteria found in meat products.128
In the U.S. and Europe, antibiotic-resistant disease-causing 
organisms are found in meat and poultry products, including 
multidrug resistant E. coli and organisms resistant to broad-
spectrum antibiotics such as penicillin, tetracycline and 
erythromycin.129 These organisms were recently discovered 
in China as well. According to Zhu Yongguan at the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, “In China and elsewhere, large amounts 
of antibiotics are used in the animal industry to promote 
growth.”130 Professor Zhu and his colleagues released a study 
in 2010 that showed soils contaminated with manure from 
livestock farms “are major reservoirs of antibiotic-resistance 
Blue-green algae bloom in a waterway outside of a large-scale 
commercial pig farm in Sichuan Province.
20 INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY
genes in the environment.”131 Researchers identified bacteria 
with tetracycline resistance in soil samples taken from feed-
lots near Beijing, Tianjin and Jiaxing. These findings will have 
implications for both animal and human health.
B. Health and dietary challenges and issues
The co-development of China’s livestock and feed industries 
over the past 30 years has raised the level of meat output 
and consumption to record and world-leading levels. Meat 
consumption has quadrupled in China since 1980 to its 
current level of 54 kg (119 pounds) per person per year. Pork 
consumption alone has doubled in the past two decades, such 
that the average Chinese person now eats 39.6 kg of pork in 
a year, compared to 20 kg in 1990.132 These profound produc-
tion gains have meant that hundreds of millions of people are 
eating more protein today than perhaps at any other time in 
their lives, helping to reduce the prevalence of undernour-
ishment in the Chinese population to 10 percent, or 130.4 
million.133 While these changes are certainly impressive, they 
have come with a host of new food system issues related to 
diets and public health. These problems warrant concerted 
policy attention. 
1. Food safety
There are a number of food safety issues associated with 
industrial livestock feeding, and China has been in the spot-
light over the past few years for several particularly severe 
offenses. While the highly publicized melamine scandals and 
animal feed recalls are most well known, there are a host of 
other food safety issues that haven’t reached scandal propor-
tions, but that are potential public health crises in the making. 
All are related to the endless pursuit of producing more meat 
in shorter periods of time—the “efficiency” upon which indus-
trial agriculture is based.
Livestock feeders in China (and elsewhere) use growth 
hormones, antibiotics and growth promoters, such as copper 
sulfate and arsenicals, to speed up the conversion of feed to 
meat.134 As a result, these substances end up in the environ-
ment via manure runoff and in the meat and animal products 
made from livestock. In 2010, reports linked growth hormone 
residues from livestock feeding found in milk formula, to 
babies in central China under 15 months old growing breasts.135 
Hormones are not yet regulated in the livestock industry in 
China. Heavy metal residues are frequently found in meat, 
coming from contaminated feed and water sources, and from 
metals used as growth promoters.136 Add to these problems 
the pesticide and myotoxin residues from feed that end up in 
food products, and it becomes clear that food safety issues are 
endemic to today’s livestock industry.
2. Dietary inequality and meat dreams
The processes of meat sector development and accompanying 
changes in diet have been uneven. The figure below shows per 
capita meat and animal products consumption in rural and 
urban China, comparing 1991 and 2008 levels. Despite across-
the-board increases and some progress toward narrowing 
the gap, urban residents still eat almost twice as much meat 
and animal products as rural residents. 
Dietary inqualities mirror other rural-urban disparities. 
In 2008, the average per capita urban income was 11,299 
RMB ($1,688 USD), while the rural level was 4,761 RMB 
Figure 5. Per Capita Meat, Poulty, Aquatic, and Animal Products Consumption, Rural and Urban China: 1991 and 2008 (kg/person/year)
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Source: 2009 China Agricultural Development Report, Ministry of Agriculture, PRC
FEEDING CHINA’S PIGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, CHINA’S SMALLHOLDER FARMERS AND FOOD SECURITY 21
($712 USD).137 The urban-rural income ratio in 2010 is 3.33 to 
1, growing from 2.56 to 1 in 1997.138 Urban annual 2008 food 
expenditures (4,260 RMB, or $636 USD) were almost three 
times as high as in rural areas (1,599 RMB, or $239 USD), 
though rural residents spent a larger share of their income 
on food (43.7 percent of rural income, versus 37.9 percent of 
urban income).139 There is also, of course, inequality within 
rural and urban areas. These data indicate that in terms of 
diet and income, inequalities are persistant and systemic.
Another form of dietary inequality is the recent emergence 
of so-called diseases of affluence in China. In the 1930s, 97 
percent of calories in the average Chinese person’s diet came 
from grains and vegetables, compared to 63 percent in 2002.140 
Today, a process that Tony Weis calls the “meatification” of 
diets is proceeding at a rapid pace.141 Meat is moving from the 
periphery to the center of Chinese diets, with differences in 
degree across the population. At the same time, the fast food 
industry is booming, with global chains like KFC and McDon-
alds operating on what seems like every street corner in 
China’s cities. Taken together, Chinese people are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to a range of diet-related diseases, 
including Type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, obestity, 
and a range of cancers. A study in 2008 found that one in every 
four adults and nearly 20 percent of children under the age 
of seven in China were overweight. In 2005, China’s central 
government reported that 70-90 million Chinese people were 
clinically obese, accounting for one-third of the global total.142 
T. Colin Campbell and Thomas M. Campbell outlined the 
relationship between these chronic illnesses and diets high 
in animal products in their 2005 book, The China Study, which 
focused on the health benefits of traditional, plant-based 
diets in China.
A Chinese man in Beijing who grew up during the times of 
meat rationing in the 1970s said “when I was as a young boy, 
my dream was to eat meat.”143 Clearly, many in China have 
realized this dream and moved well beyond the famines and 
rationing of the past to eat meat everyday, and sometimes 
at every meal. Others, especially in rural areas, still live 
in a world where meat is a luxury. Using the $1.25 USD per 
day poverty guideline, there were 150 million poor in China 
at the end of 2009.144 According to Li Xiaoyun, Dean of the 
Center for Integrated Agricultural Development at the China 
Agricultural University, an additional 20 to 30 percent of the 
rural population (140 to 230 million people) are precariously 
close to slipping back below the poverty line because of sick-
ness, natural disaster or economic recession.145 This vulner-
able population is predominantly smallholder farmers, miles 
away from affluence and its diet-related diseases, and who 
may still dream of having more meat to eat.
C. Smallholder challenges and issues
Smallholder farmers living in China’s vast rural regions are 
most vulnerable as a group to livelihood and lifestyle trans-
formation as a result of feed and livestock sector restructuring. 
In addition to challenges in market access and competition, 
they face other intense pressures related to broader-scale 
social change. The rural population is somewhere between 
700 and 900 million, depending on how migrant workers 
are counted. The experiences of more than half of China’s 
population, therefore, need to be carefully considered in 
constructing policies for agricultural development.
1. Market access and competition
Backyard pig farmers146 and small-scale soybean farmers 
consistently struggle in the new market agro-economy. Pig 
farmers who want to sell their animals are at a severe disad-
vantage in terms of evolving meat quality standards that favor 
leaner pork, safety requirements based on international stan-
dards and the structure of state subsidy programs. First, the 
longer production cycle on backyard farms produces pork with 
a higher fat-to-lean ratio. While many Chinese people prefer 
the flavor of this meat, market standards within China are 
increasingly for leaner pork, making it difficult for small-scale 
farmers to enter into certain markets. Additionally, because 
they usually cannot pay for the testing or certification schemes 
that are currently used to verify hygiene standards (increas-
ingly using the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO) system), smallholders are excluded in terms of food 
safety. At the same time, backyard farmers are largely outside 
of the subsidy arena, as livestock subsidy programs are by and 
large aimed at industrializing the sector. [For a more complete 
look at smallholder disadvantages see, Li Jian, The Decline of 
Household Pig Farming in Rural Southwest China: Socioeco-
nomic Obstacles and Policy Implications,” Culture & Agricul-
ture, Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 61-77e (2010).]
Small-scale soybean farmers have been losing money in recent 
years because they can’t sell their beans at a break-even price. 
Cheap GM imports, a struggling domestic crushing industry 
and infrastructural challenges of getting their harvest to 
potential markets, combine to create an incredibly difficult 
situation. As futures markets and hedging become more 
prevalent in China, smallholders are further challenged by 
gaps in information delivery. There are currently four futures 
exchanges in China, with the Dalian Commodity Exchange 
managing trade in soybean, soybean meal, soybean oil, corn, 
palm oil and petrochemical futures contracts. Efforts at 
improving rural price information are underway to help fill 
these gaps, but there is currently no centralized system in 
place to communicate price issues to small farmers.
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2. Social issues: Migrant labor, livelihoods and lifestyles
Smallholder issues can’t be separated from the urbanization 
trend that is swelling the populations of China’s cities. There 
are currently 240 million workers in China who constitute a 
“floating population”147 that moves from the countryside to cities 
where they work as migrant laborers. Virtually all are classi-
fied as rural residents because they hold rural hukou in China’s 
household registration system.148 Even those who have been 
away working in a city for a decade or more are still considered 
rural residents, and so receive social benefits only in their rural 
homes. This means that they cannot take part in healthcare, 
education and social insurance benefits that urban residents 
enjoy in many cities. So while migrant worker wages flow back 
to rural families, other privileges do not.
This migration, the largest in human history, has created 
challenging social conditions in the countryside. Half of 
migrant workers were born in the 1980s, and most are male, 
though female migrants are also quite common. The result 
is that in rural areas, “Just like in wartime, women, children, 
and the elderly make up most of the population.”149 Those 
who stay behind and continue farming are referred to as the 
“773861 army,” named for elderly residents (i.e., 77 years old), 
female (mostly married) residents (“38” is March 8, Interna-
tional Women’s Day), and children (“61” is June 1 for Interna-
tional Children’s Day). This army works the fields, raises the 
livestock and maintains smallholder farming systems while 
young family members labor sometimes thousands of miles 
away from home. Families in this way are split, and the work 
of agricultural production falls to those with the least amount 
of education, and perhaps those least adequately equipped to 
innovate in farming practice and marketing.150 As agriculture 
becomes increasingly marketized, this is yet another hurdle 
for smallholders.
The processes of industrialization of agriculture on the one 
hand, and the migration of labor from rural to urban areas 
on the other, are both key components of the central govern-
ment’s current model of development. Experts predict that 
by 2030, central policies will effectively move hundreds 
of millions more people to China’s cities, leaving only 400 
million in rural areas. The 1.4 billion urban residents will 
need massive amounts of food, which large-scale, vertically 
integrated farms and companies will largely supply. This 
model is rigged against smallholders, for whom it becomes 
more and more difficult to maintain their livelihoods and life-
styles. The annual cost for a soybean farmer, for example, to 
keep one child in school is one-fifth of their annual income.151 
Migrant labor becomes a necessity for survival, urging more 
and more people toward the cities where they can earn wages 
that will support rural households.
Despite the drivers and incentives that are urging rural 
people to urban areas, not everyone wants to migrate. The 
Chongqing municipal government recently enacted a policy 
that allows farmers and other rural residents to become urban 
citizens by changing to an urban hukou. The program hasn’t 
been as popular as officials expected, as many rural people 
are opting to remain in the countryside. The primary reason 
for this seems to be related to rural livelihoods and lifestyle. 
A rural resident outside of Chongqing told the Global Times, 
“I am familiar with the rural way of life and I could raise my 
family by working on my farm. If I become an urban resident, 
I would be stripped of the right to use my farmland within 
three years.”152 Rural subsidies, elimination of agricultural 
taxes, land policies, rising costs of living in urban areas, labor 
market restructuring, and preference for rural livelihoods 
and lifestyles are important reasons for people to stay in the 
countryside. Even in the context of mass urbanization and 
industrial agriculture, small-scale farming, it seems, will 
remain a vital part of China’s food system well into the future.
V. Discussion: Food security and 
models of agricultural development
Food security is of the utmost importance to Chinese authori-
ties. In making agricultural development policy, they must 
consider not only how to feed the country’s 1.3 billion people 
on a limited landbase, but also how to reign in income and 
dietary inequalities and keep food prices low enough to avoid 
widespread discontent. In the post-reform period,  authori-
ties have been actively promoting large-scale industrial 
agriculture as the supply source for addressing food security. 
This model, however, falls short for addressing both land-
efficiency needs and food and income inequalities.
China must feed 21 percent of the world’s population using 
only nine percent of the world’s arable land. Given these 
constraints, the argument goes that further industrializing 
agriculture is the only way to address food needs for a huge and 
growing population without bringing more land into produc-
tion. Intensive feed and livestock production are part and 
parcel of this approach. Raising hundreds of thousands of pigs 
on imported soy in CAFOs appears on the surface to use much 
less land than so-called traditional forms of swine husbandry, 
which involve small farms spread out across the countryside. 
But industrial pig production is a land-intensive system in at 
least two ways. First, on the input side, producing one kilo-
gram of industrial pork requires about 13 kilograms of feed.153 
To meet this need, China purchases tens of millions of tons of 
soybeans and corn from South America and the United States 
every year. CAFO production, therefore, can appear land-
efficient only because livestock have been separated—some-
times by thousands of miles—from sources of feed. Second, 
on the output side, industrial pork production requires huge 
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tracts of land to act as a sink for manure. Confining animals 
at the industrial scale results in more manure than local land, 
watersheds and air can absorb. As a result, CAFOs pollute, 
poison, and otherwise degrade land, water and air on a scale 
that extends well beyond the sites of production.
Industrial agriculture is also proposed as a way to ensure 
“cheap pork for all,” a key to the Chinese conception of food 
security. Government policies and subsidies support the 
scaling up of pork production, particularly through highly 
integrated domestic agribusiness firms. These companies, in 
turn, sell pork either directly or indirectly to retail markets. 
Because the middle and upper classes in China live exclusively 
in cities, large-scale pig farms are situated near urban centers, 
and most commercial pork is sold there as well. Industrial pork 
rarely reaches poor and rural areas, and changing markets 
and market standards erode rural livelihoods. This model of 
food security turns out to be a model of plenty for those who 
can afford it, and deficiences for those who cannot.
As a way to get around the problem of limited land, and to 
increase pork availability, a new method has emerged in 
recent years. The Chinese government and industry have been 
“going out” to invest in land in Africa, Latin America and other 
parts of Asia154 for feed and food crop cultivation. This move 
takes development policy beyond just a focus on importing 
grains and oilseeds for the domestic feed industry, toward 
state and private ownership and control of resources in other 
countries. Authorities are pursuing this path in the name of 
increasing food security, which today means increasing meat 
consumption, particularly for the upper and middles classes 
in China’s cities who can afford to live the meat dream. 
Given the limitations of industrial agriculture as a model of 
equitable, land- and resource-efficient food security, Chinese 
policymakers would be well-advised to look for alterna-
tive approaches to ensure long-term sustainability. There 
are such viable alternatives based on small-scale, dispersed, 
locally-situated agriculture. The World Bank and United 
Nations–commissioned International Assessment of Agri-
cultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 
(IAASTD) report advocates a multifunctional role for agri-
culture in reducing poverty and social/gender inequalities, 
stabalizing rural cultures, reversing environmental degrada-
tion and mitigating climate change. Stating that “business 
as usual is not an option,” given the combination of climate, 
energy, water and food crises, the IAASTD questions indus-
trial agriculture (and GM food) as the solution to the social 
and ecological crises associated with global agribusiness, on 
the grounds that markets fail to adequately value environ-
mental and social harm.155 Policies for models that do a better 
job of valuing these kinds of harms, as well as multifunction-
ality, offer more sustainable and equitable ways forward. 
IV. Ways forward
Given the still-growing demand for pork in China and the 
various economic and policy dynamics described above, 
continuing the current path of industrialization may seem 
inevitable. But as this report has shown, there are consider-
able negative social and environmental impacts associated 
with that path, including pollution, climate and biodiversity-
related issues, dietary and public health issues, and rural 
economy and livelihood issues. This section suggests steps 
that policymakers in China could take to address the prob-
lems associated with the current model of agricultural devel-
opment, and pursue a more equitable and sustainable path.
1. ASSESS THE FULL SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH COSTS OF INDUSTRIAL PORK AND FEED PRODUCTION. 
In the absence of such an assessment, industrial livestock 
feeding appears to produce relatively cheap and abundant 
meat in the face of growing consumer demand, and alterna-
tives seem to carry greater costs. Some of the externalized 
costs of the industrial system that need to be calculated are:
■■ costs of cleaning up environmental pollution (water, 
soil, air), including manure and agrochemical runoff 
and contamination, and livelihood losses that result;
■■ medical and insurance costs from increased morbidity 
and mortality associated with pollution, overconsump-
tion of livestock products and diseases of affluence;
■■ medical and research costs from the emergence and 
spread of zoonotic diseases associated with intensive 
livestock feeding;
■■ medical and research costs associated with the emer-
gence and spread of antibiotic resistant pathogens as a 
result of non-therapeutic use of antibiotics in pig feed; 
■■ costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions from 
all stages of industrial livestock production; 
■■ loss of manure as a source of nutrients and organic 
matter on croplands, and increased costs of manufac-
turing and using commercial fertilizers;
■■ economic and food security costs to smallholders and 
rural communities where household pig raising is 
undermined by subsidized, industrial operations; and 
■■ costs associated with the loss of domesticated plant and 
animal diversity.
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There is also a whole set of social and environmental costs 
associated with China’s policy of supplying its soy needs 
through imports. In addition to the implications for domestic 
small-scale soy farmers, many of these costs are felt outside 
of the country. The loss of biodiversity and local livelihoods 
from the conversation of forest or grassland to large-scale soy 
and corn plantations in Brazil is one important example. 
Once all of these currently hidden costs are taken into account, 
China’s industrial pork will not look like such a bargain. Poli-
cymakers should adjust incentives and regulations so the 
market price of industrial pork more accurately reflects its 
full costs, thereby reducing its competitiveness in relation to 
pork from more sustainable production systems. They should 
actively pursue a production system that better balances 
price, nutrition, rural livelihoods and other environmental 
and social values. 
2. REDIRECT RESEARCH AND EXTENSION FUNDS FROM 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION TO SUSTAINABLE ANIMAL 
HUSBANDRY AND CROP PRODUCTION. China is home to 
more than 6,000 varieties of soybeans and more than 100 
indigenous pig breeds that are important sources of genetic 
diversity. Recent policies and funding structures, however, 
are systematically replacing these locally adapted varieties 
with a narrow range of exotic, industrial ones. Research and 
extension efforts should be focused conserving and utilizing 
these varieties and breeds, and innovating on sustainable, not 
industrial, methods of crop and livestock production.
3. REDIRECT SUBSIDIES FROM INDUSTRIAL LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTION TO LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS AND FARMER 
ASSOCIATIONS. Smallholder agroecosystems and the collective 
systems of knowledge associated with them are steadily being 
dismantled in the rush to industrialize and urbanize. Subsidies 
should be combined with research and extension to support 
smallholders, local food systems and strong farmer associations.
4. PROMOTE HEALTHY DIETS FOR ALL. In the course of devel-
opment, many industrialized countries “overshot” the levels of 
animal protein consumption now recognized as most healthy, 
and are paying the price in the form of epidemic levels of diet-
related disease and mortality. China’s policymakers seems bent 
on blindly imitating the mistakes of the West, despite having a 
traditional diet identical to that recommended by contemporary 
nutritionists. Rather than promoting a meat-centric diet, Chinese 
authorities should promote healthy diets for all, and discourage 
over-consumption of meat and animal products.
5. MAINTAIN FOOD RESERVES TO ENSURE ADEQUATE 
SUPPLIES. China should continue to manage domestic food 
(grain and pork) reserves to avoid shortages and to protect 
the most vulnerable populations against price volatility. 
These reserves should be managed in equitable ways.
6. CONTINUE TO PROMOTE HOUSEHOLD METHANE 
DIGESTERS FOR BIOGAS PRODUCTION, AND REQUIRE 
LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMS TO BUILD BIOGAS 
PLANTS. Chinese central authorities have been actively 
promoting household biogas production by providing subsi-
dies to small farmers for methane digesters. Of the 140 million 
rural households in the country, the Ministry of Agriculture 
estimates that 35 million currently use digesters to produce 
cooking gas and fertilizer. On the other hand, less than one 
percent of the 4.2 million large-scale livestock farms in 
China employ this method to deal with manure.156 Authorities 
should require commercial farms to install large-scale biogas 
plants in conjunction with their production facilities.
7. ADDRESS THE ROLES OF TRADE POLICIES AND INDUS-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION IN LIVELIHOOD LOSS FOR SMALL-
SCALE FARMERS. The influx of cheap imports and the growing 
concentration of ownership by a narrow range of vertically 
integrated agribusiness firms creates an uneven playing field 
for domestic producers and local products. The government 
should actively intervene to restrict market concentration 
and create a fair market environment for small producers. 
Programs should help smallholders meet changing market 
and safety standards, compete with cheap imports and indus-
trially produced agricultural products, and cooperate. 
8. SUPPORT DIVERSE SCALES AND FORMS OF AGRICUL-
TURAL AND LIVELIHOOD PRODUCTION. Rather than 
promoting a “one size fits all” model of development with 
industrial agriculture as the centerpiece, recognize the key 
role that smallholder farmers play in the country’s food and 
agricultural system, and support these systems as vital parts 
of future plans for development and sustainability. 
Of course, pursuing an alternative path also has its costs. 
But if fundamental government priorities of supplying ever-
increasing amounts of meat while keeping retail prices low 
don’t change, alternative approaches may never receive 
serious consideration. After all, many of the externalities 
of the current system are either suffered by economically 
and politically weak groups such as smallholder farmers, or 
will be felt most acutely in the future. The pragmatic solu-
tion for current leaders may still be to stay the (industrial) 
course. Meanwhile, the limitations and crises associated 
with this model—water and soil pollution, increased green-
house gas emissions, antibiotic resistance, decreased species 
and genetic diversity, food safety issues, dietary inequalities, 
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chronic disease, the squelching of smallholder livelihoods, 
and the ever-widening gap between rich and poor—are 
already being felt. 
VI. Conclusion
Feeding China’s nearly 700 million pigs is a massive under-
taking. By pursuing an industrial model of agricultural devel-
opment, based in large part on producing millions of tons of 
pork from imported feedstuffs, Chinese authorities and poli-
cymakers are promoting a paradigm that they believe will 
ensure the country’s food security. They are doing so with the 
help of trade liberalization, state and private investment, and 
foreign and domestic agribusiness firms. 
Judged against the narrow goal of increasing the country’s 
pork production, they have thus far been successful. But 
the industrialization of China’s pork and pig feed also has 
mounting social and environmental costs. And while these 
costs may be harder to quantify than rising production figures, 
decision-makers would be wise to take them into account and 
consider whether, in the long term, another path may better 
serve the nation’s food security, environment and develop-
ment needs. 
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